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The stylized model presented in this paper extends the approach developed by Fischer 
and Newell (2008) by analysing the optimal policy design in a context with more than 
one externality while taking explicitly into account uncertainty surrounding future 
emission damage costs.  
In the presence of massive uncertainties and technology spillovers, well-designed sup-
port mechanisms for renewables are found to play a major role, notably as a means for 
compensating for technology spillovers, yet also for reducing the investors’ risks. How-
ever,  the design of these  support mechanisms needs to be target-aimed and well-
focused. Besides uncertainty on the state of the world concerning actual marginal emis-
sion damage, we consider the technological progress through R&D as well as learning-
by-doing. A portfolio of three policy instruments is then needed to cope with the existing 
externalities and optimal instrument choice is shown to be dependent on risk aversion 
of society as a whole as well as of entrepreneurs.  
To illustrate the role of uncertainty for the practical choice of policy instruments, an em-
pirical application is considered. The application is calibrated to recent global data from 
IEA and thus allows identifying the main drivers for the optimal policy mix. In addition 
to assumptions on technology costs and uncertainty of emission damage cost, the impor-
tance of technology spillover clearly plays a key role. Yet under some plausible parame-
ter settings, direct subsidies to production are found to be of lower importance than 
very substantial R&D supports. 
 
Keywords:  
Externality, technology, learning, uncertainty, climate change, spillover, renewable energy, policy 
 
JEL-Classification:  




Chair for Management Sciences and Energy Economics, 
University of Duisburg-Essen (Campus Essen) 
Universitätsstr. 11, 45117 Essen 





Chair for Management Sciences and Energy Economics, 
University of Duisburg-Essen (Campus Essen) 
Universitätsstr. 11, 45117 Essen 






Table of contents 
List of Symbols ......................................................................................................................... ii 
1  Introduction ............................................................................................................................  1 
2  Model with uncertainty  ...........................................................................................................  3 
2.1  Fossil-fuel sector ...............................................................................................................  4 
2.2  Renewables sector .............................................................................................................  4 
2.3  Household sector ...............................................................................................................  5 
3  Welfare optimum under uncertainty  .......................................................................................  6 
3.1  Welfare under uncertainty .................................................................................................  6 
3.2  Government revenues ........................................................................................................  6 
3.3  Environmental benefits .....................................................................................................  6 
3.4  Conditions for welfare optimum .......................................................................................  7 
4  Market equilibrium and optimal incentives  ............................................................................  7 
4.1  Fossil fuel sector  ................................................................................................................  7 
4.2  Renewables sector .............................................................................................................  8 
5  Empirical application  ..............................................................................................................  9 
6  Conclusion ............................................................................................................................  13 
References ................................................................................................................................  15 
 
   ii 
 
 
List of Symbols  
B      environmental benefits 
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n      number of years 
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y      marginal gas-powered technology (output) 
δ      discount rate 
θ      tax on fossil-fuelled generation 
µ      technology based emissions 
ξ      uncertainty 
π      profit 
ρ      spillover rate 
σ      R&D subsidy 
τ      emissions price 
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1  Introduction 
Despite intense research and policy efforts, still considerable uncertainties surround 
climate change, both on the actual strength and impacts and on the costs of any bundle 
of recipes against it. Standard environmental economics suggests two alternative first-
best solutions in this situation: Either install a global cap-and-trade regime for green-
house gas emissions or globally implement a uniform tax on these emissions. In both 
cases, the emission cap respectively the tax rate would have to be chosen as to realize 
the optimal emission level, where marginal damage costs equal marginal mitigation 
costs (cf. e.g. Baumol and Oates, 1998). 
Although the EU emission trading system may be seen as a first step towards a practical 
implementation of these theoretical insights, current policy practice frequently follows 
other paths for supporting low carbon technologies. Both in the US and in the EU, states 
notably use specific programs for promoting renewable energies1
In this paper, the benefits of specific policies beside a general tax or a cap-and-trade are 
investigated taking especially into account the uncertainty surrounding future emission 
damage costs. Thereby the focus is on the implications of technology learning and the 
associated externalities. Following Jaffe et al. (2005), the presence of more than one 
market failure requires a single policy for every failure (cf. also Tinbergen 1952). There-
fore, the presence of knowledge spillovers besides an emissions externality requires 
multiple instruments to optimally adjust for the externalities (cf. e.g. also Butler, Neuhoff 
2008).  
. In Europe systems of 
feed-in tariffs are more often used (e.g. Germany), whereas in the US frequently renew-
able portfolio standards are implemented.  
Baker and Shittu (2008) give an overview on different papers dealing with uncertainty 
and endogenous technical change, but all of these do not cover optimal policy design but 
optimal investments in R&D or learning. Optimal environmental and technology policies 
are treated in Bläsi and Requate (2007) as well as in Fischer and Newell (2008) and 
Lehmann (2009). The former consider two types of electricity generators, emitting fossil 
fuel utilities and a non-emitting renewable sector based on wind energy. Furthermore, 
they account for the vertical structure of this latter sector by taking into account the 
wind-turbine producers profiting from learning-by-doing. As well as Bläsi and Requate 
(2007), Fischer and Newell (2008) and Lehmann (2009) consider the optimal policy in-
struments, yet they investigate a two-sector model consisting of a renewables sector and 
a fossil-fuel sector without taking into account the vertical structure. Lehmann extends 
and focuses the model of Fischer and Newell on Germany including an efficiency effect 
                                                        
1 But also energy efficiency improvements in buildings and in manufacturing are often subsidized. 2 
 
 
and distortions due to add-on payments funding a feed-in tariff. However, all papers do 
not take into account the impact of uncertainty on future emission damages on the op-
timal policy. 
The stylized model presented in this paper extends the approach developed by Fischer 
and Newell (2008) by analysing the optimal policy design in a context with more than 
one externality while  taking  explicitly  into account uncertainty surrounding future 
emission damage costs.  Uncertainty in the context of the optimal choice of climate 
change policy instruments has also been taken into account by Adar and Griffin (1976) 
who compare different pollution control instruments with the marginal damage function 
or the marginal control costs being uncertain. Pizer (1999) shows the importance of in-
cluding uncertainty in policy design models, even if an integrated climate-economy 
model is used to examine different policies designs. It is shown that excluding uncer-
tainty leads to reduced expected marginal benefits and therewith to policy recommen-
dations which are not stringent enough. In this paper, we show that the theoretical re-
sults established by Fischer and Newell (2008) generally carry through to the case with 
uncertainty2
 
. I.e., if knowledge is accumulated both through R&D and learning-by-doing, 
then three policy instruments are needed to correct for technology spillovers and emis-
sion externalities: an emission tax or cap, an R&D subsidy and a production subsidy. 
However, in the presence of insolvency costs and the corresponding risk aversion of 
companies, the R&D subsidy has to increase above the level required under certainty. 
The same holds for the production subsidy. Moreover it is shown that innovating firms 
will not be able to recover their costs even in the absence of technology spillover, if 
there is perfect competition and no R&D subsidy. Besides the theoretical focus on uncer-
tainty, optimal policy instruments are analysed on a global scale. The model brings to-
gether two perspectives: a pure social planning point-of-view on the one hand that indi-
cates the optimal societal strategy to cope with uncertainty and on the other hand, a 
market equilibrium viewpoint to determine the optimal policies to reach the societal 
targets and to assess the effects on the firms’ profits. 
The paper is organised as follows: Section two introduces the model with uncertainty 
before the conditions for a social optimum are discussed in section three. In the next sec-
tion, optimal policy instruments are investigated and the market equilibrium is exam-
ined. In section five, the model is applied to the case of world-wide emission abatement 
until 2050 and the paper concludes in section six.  
   
                                                        
2 Similar results have been established earlier (cf. e.g. Schöb 1995) for first-best environmental policy in-
struments in the standard textbook setting without knowledge spillover. 3 
 
 
2  Model with uncertainty  
Following Fischer and Newell (2008), the model encompasses two periods representing 
each a specific number of years n(1) and n(2). Production and consumption as well as 
emissions occur in both periods, investment in knowledge by contrast only in the first. 
Discounting between both periods at a specific factor δ is included, but not within each 
period.  
Two subsectors, a fossil-fuel fired and CO2-emitting electricity generating sector, de-
noted with superscript F, and a nonemitting renewable energy sector, denoted with su-
perscript R, exist in the model. Both take prices as given in each period. The fossil-fuel 
subsector includes a CO2 intensive technology x, e.g. coal-fired power generation, and a 
less emitting technology y, such as combined cycle gas plants.  
With an annual output of fossil-fuelled electricity production f(t)=x(t)+y(t) in period t, the 
total emissions E with technologies i and fixed emissions μi for each technology are: 
 
𝐸(𝑡) = 𝜇𝑥𝑥(𝑡) + 𝜇𝑦𝑦(𝑡) 
 
(1) 
Production costs 𝐶𝑖  of each technology are assumed to be increasing in output and 
strictly convex.  
The total output of the renewables sector consisting of N different generators in a spe-
cific period is 𝑞𝑡and the costs of production are 𝐺(𝑡)(𝐾(𝑡),𝑞(𝑡)).  The knowledge stock 
𝐾(𝑡)(𝐻(𝑡),𝑄(𝑡)) is thereby a function of the total cumulative knowledge from R&D 𝐻(𝑡), 
increasing in proportion to the knowledge generated in each period h1  (i.e. 
H2=H1+n(1)h1) and of the cumulative production 𝑄(𝑡) inducing learning-by-doing. The 
latter also increases with total output during period 1, i.e. Q2=Q1+n(1)q1.  Research ex-
penditures 𝑅(ℎ(𝑡)) are increasing and convex in the amount of new R&D knowledge 
generated in one year. The factor ρ indicates the degree of appropriability of the R&D 
benefits by the firm incurring the R&D expenses. Then 1-ρ is the spillover rate. (cf. 
Fischer and Newell 2008). 
 
In the equilibrium, total consumers’ electricity demand D(P) must equal total supply, 
consisting of the fossil-fuel and the renewable energy sectors’ output where 𝑃(𝑡) denotes 
the price of electricity: 
 
𝐷�𝑃(𝑡)� = 𝑥(𝑡) + 𝑦(𝑡) + 𝑞(𝑡)  (2) 
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In the next subsections, state dependency will be included for all variables that depend 
on the revealed marginal damage costs for CO2, i.e. namely the variables at stage 2. Sub-
sequently the objective functions for the different economic agents of the fossil-fuel ge-
nerators. 
2.1  Fossil-fuel sector 
The opportunities for a reduction of the greenhouse gas emissions in the fossil-fuel sec-
tor rely largely on fuel switching. Let τ(t) be the price of emissions and θ(t) be the tax on 
fossil-fuel generation at time t. Depending on state 𝜉, the profits of a representative emit-
ting firm are: 
 
𝜋𝐹 = 𝑛(1)��𝑃(1) − 𝜃(1)��𝑥(1) + 𝑦(1)� − 𝐶𝑥(𝑥(1)) − 𝐶𝑦(𝑦(1)) − 𝜏(1)(𝜇𝑥𝑥(1)
+ 𝜇𝑦𝑦(1))�
+ 𝗿𝑛(2)��𝑃(2)(𝜉) − 𝜃(2)(𝜉)��𝑥(2)(𝜉) − 𝑦(2)(𝜉)� − 𝐶𝑥(𝑥(2)(𝜉))
− 𝐶𝑦(𝑦(2)(𝜉)) − 𝜏(2)(𝜇𝑥𝑥(2)(𝜉) + 𝜇𝑦𝑦(2)(𝜉))� 
 
(3) 
With regard to output from each fuel source, the firm maximizes the profits, resulting in 
the following first order conditions: 
 
𝜕𝜋𝐹
𝜕𝑥(1)=0:   𝑃(1) = 𝜃(1) + 𝐶𝑥
′�𝑥(1)� + 𝜏(1)𝜇𝑥  (4) 
 
𝜕𝜋𝐹
𝜕𝑥(2)(𝜉)=0:   𝑃(2)(𝜉) = 𝜃(2)(𝜉) + 𝐶𝑥
′�𝑥(2)(𝜉)� + 𝜏(2)𝜇𝑥  (5) 
 
𝜕𝜋𝐹
𝜕𝑦(1)=0:   𝑃(1) = 𝜃(1) + 𝐶𝑦
′�𝑦(1)� + 𝜏(1)𝜇𝑦  (6) 
 
𝜕𝜋𝐹
𝜕𝑦(2)(𝜉)=0:   𝑃(2)(𝜉) = 𝜃(2)(𝜉) + 𝐶𝑦
′(𝑦(2)(𝜉)) + 𝜏(2)(𝜉)𝜇𝑦  (7) 
 
All together, these equations show that coal generation is used in each period until its 
marginal costs equal those of gas. 
2.2  Renewables sector 
Under uncertainty, the profits of a representative renewable electricity generator in-




𝜋𝑅 = 𝑛(1)��𝑃(1) + 𝑠(1)��𝑞(1)� − 𝐺�𝐾(1),𝑞(1)� − (1 − 𝜎)𝑅(ℎ(1))�




  𝐾(2)(𝜉) = 𝐾(𝐻(2)(𝜉);𝑄(2)(𝜉)) 
 
Taking the degree of R&D-investment appropriability ρ into account, the firm maximises 






𝑛(1)(𝑃(1) + 𝑠(1) − 𝗿𝜌𝑛(2) ∫𝐺𝐾 �𝐾(2)(𝜉),𝑞(2)(𝜉)�𝑛(1)𝐾𝑄(𝐻(2)(𝜉),𝑄(2)(𝜉))𝑑𝜉 
(9) 
   
𝜕𝜋𝑅
𝜕𝑞(2)(𝜉)=0:   𝐺𝑞 �𝐾(2)(𝜉),𝑞(2)(𝜉)� = (𝑃(2)(𝜉) + 𝑠(2)(𝜉))𝑞(2)(𝜉)  (10) 
 
𝜕𝜋𝑅
𝜕ℎ(1)=0:   𝑅ℎ�ℎ(1)� = −𝗿
𝜌
(1−𝜎)𝑛(2)𝐺𝐾 �𝐾(2)(𝜉),𝑞(2)(𝜉)�𝐾𝐻(𝐻(2)(𝜉),𝑄(2)(𝜉))  (11) 
   
Equation (9) shows that renewable energy is produced until its marginal production 
costs equal the value of all received payments, including besides the market price and 
the subsidies also the decreased production costs in the second period, as far as it is ap-
propriable. As no learning is included in period 2, no related term can be found in eq. 
(10). As shown in eq. (11), the firm invests in R&D until the related discounted returns 
equal the marginal investment costs for research. 
2.3  Household sector 
For households it does not matter whether electricity is generated by renewables or fos-
sil-fuel generators, i.e. both are considered as perfect substitutes. With 𝐷�𝑃 �� represent-
ing the households’ total electricity demand, consumer surplus is 
   
𝐶𝑆 = 𝑛(1)� 𝐷�𝑃 ��𝑑𝑃 �
+∞
𝑃(1)







3  Welfare optimum under uncertainty 
In this section, the societal optimum under uncertainty is formally derived using the 
aforementioned sectoral profit functions. 
3.1  Welfare under uncertainty 
Total welfare is a function of the sum of the producer and consumer rents, to which en-
vironmental benefits and governmental revenues/spending have to be added. Given the 
wide-spread risk aversion among individuals and in entire societies, welfare is set to be 
a nondecreasing concave utility function U of the aforementioned sum. Moreover wel-
fare is dependent on the state of the world 𝜉 and thus an integration over all possible 
states of the worlds will deliver the expected welfare to be maximised.  
 
𝑊 = �𝑈(𝐵 + 𝐶𝑆 + 𝜋 + 𝑉)𝑑𝜉  (13) 
 
The total profit π thereby encompasses the individual profits from both the emitting and 
the nonemitting sectors representative firm (𝜋 = 𝜋𝐹 + 𝜋𝑅). 
3.2  Government revenues 
As we use a partial model, the government revenues or spending V, influenced by the 
implemented policies, have to be considered when computing total welfare. Thereby we 
assume implicitly in line with Fischer and Newell (2008) that any revenues raised are 
returned as lump-sum transfers. 
 
𝑉 = 𝑛(1)�𝜃(1)𝑓(1) + 𝜏(1)�𝜇𝑥𝑥(1) + 𝜇𝑦𝑦(1)� − 𝑠(1)𝑞(1) − 𝜎𝑅(ℎ(1)�
+ 𝗿𝑛(2)�𝜃(2)(𝜉)𝑓(2)(𝜉) + 𝜏(2)�𝜇𝑥𝑥(2)(𝜉) + 𝜇𝑦𝑦(2)(𝜉)�
− 𝑠(2)(𝜉)𝑞(2)�(𝜉) 
(14) 
3.3  Environmental benefits 
Climate change mitigation results in environmental benefits B which are a function of 
the total emissions and can be denoted as follows. 
 
𝐵 = 𝐵�𝑛(1)𝐸(1) + 𝑛(2)𝐸(2),𝜉�





3.4  Conditions for welfare optimum 
Maximising the total welfare W (eq. (13)) yields the following first order conditions: 
 
𝜕𝑊
𝜕𝑥(1) = 0: 𝑃(1) − 𝐶𝑥
′(𝑥(1)) = 






𝜕𝑥(2) = 0: 𝑈′ ∙ �𝐵𝐸 𝑛(2)𝜇𝑥 + 𝑛(2)�𝑃(2) − 𝐶𝑥
′(𝑥(2))�� = 0  (17) 
 
𝜕𝑊
















𝜕𝑃(2) = 0:  ⟹ 𝑥(2) + 𝑦(2)+𝑞(2) − 𝐷�𝑃(2)� = 0 
 
(21) 
As the welfare optimum in the planner perspective is independent of the tax rates resp. 
production and R&D subsidies, the corresponding terms vanish in the total welfare and 
the first-order conditions are not shown here3 (20) . If U’>0, then eq.   leads to an equili-
brium of demand and supply in period 1 as does eq. (21) for period 2. This is in line with 
the market equilibrium postulated in equation (2). 
4  Market equilibrium and optimal incentives 
4.1  Fossil fuel sector 
Under uncertainty, risk aversion implies that the utility of the representative firm’s prof-
its is a nondecreasing concave function again to be integrated over all states of the 
world. This results in the weighted profit TF: 
 
𝑇𝐹 = �𝑆𝐹(𝜋𝐹)𝑑𝜉   (22) 
 
                                                        
3 Cf. Appendix A: Further welfare FOC’s 8 
 
 
Maximizing these profits yields the following first order conditions: 
 
𝜕𝑇𝐹
𝜕𝑥(1) = 0:  𝑛(1) ∙ �𝑃(1) − 𝜇𝑥𝜏(1) − 𝐶𝑥
′(𝑥(1))� ∙ ∫𝑆𝐹
′𝑑𝜉 = 0  (23) 
 
𝜕𝑇𝐹
𝜕𝑥(2) = 0: 𝗿𝑛(2) ∙ 𝑆𝐹
′
∙ �𝑃(2) − 𝜇𝑥𝜏(2) − 𝐶𝑥
′(𝑥(2))� = 0 
(24) 
   
From eq. (24), the following condition linking prices and taxes may be derived: 
 
𝑃(2) − 𝐶𝑥
′�𝑥(2)� = 𝜇𝑥𝜏(2)  (25) 
 
By comparing equations (25) and (17), one may easily see that consistent incentives are 
given if the emission tax equals the marginal change in the environmental benefits:  
 
𝜏(2) = −𝐵𝐸  (26) 
 
Hence as in Fischer and Newell (2008), damages caused by emissions are internalised by 
setting the emission price in period 2 equal to the marginal damage. 
Under uncertainty, the optimal policy for period 1 is somewhat more complicated. Yet, 




∫𝑈′𝑑𝜉   (27) 
 
Hence the optimal tax rate is equal to a weighted average of the marginal damages -BE 
under different states of the world ξ, with the corresponding marginal welfare U’ used as 
weighting factor. 
Analogously to eq. (23)-(27) for technology x, similar relationships may be established 
for technology y. 
4.2  Renewables sector 
For the renewable energy sector, the weighted profit TR with no renewable generation 
subsidy (𝑠(2) = 0) in period 2 is given by eq. (28): 
𝑇𝑅 = �𝑆𝑅(𝜋𝑅)𝑑𝜉 
(28) 
From derivatives of the renewable sectors profit function the following conditions may 









′ 𝑑𝜉 𝐾𝑄(𝐻(2),𝑄(2))  (29) 
 
𝜕𝑇𝑅









𝜕𝑞(2) = 0: 𝗿𝑛(2) ∙ 𝑆𝑅
′
∙ �𝑃(2) + 𝑠(2) − 𝐺𝑞 (𝐾(2),𝑄(2))� = 0 
(31) 
 
Combining equations (30) and (19), the optimal R&D subsidy σ is given through: 
 










The share of subsidy is hence clearly decreasing with an increasing degree of appropria-
tion ρ for knowledge. The ratio on the right hand side is a coefficient of two weighted 
sums of marginal cost reductions through knowledge accumulation. In the denominator, 
the marginal welfare is used as weights, whereas in the numerator the marginal utility of 
the firm is used as weight. If the firms are more risk averse (e.g. because they are small) 
than the society as a whole, then this ratio is strictly smaller than 1. In that case an R&D 
subsidy is justified even if knowledge is fully appropriable (i.e. 𝜌 = 1). The optimal sub-
sidy rate yet turns out to be independent of 𝐾𝐻, i.e. the marginal benefits of R&D expend-
iture in terms of knowledge accumulation.  
Making use of this result, the optimal production subsidy may be obtained by combining 
eqs. (31), (29) and (18).  
 
𝑠(1) =  𝜎 ∙
−∫𝑈′𝐺𝐾�𝐾(2),𝑞(2)�𝑑𝜉
∫𝑈′𝑑𝜉 𝐾𝑄(𝐻(2),𝑄(2))  (33) 
 
The optimal production subsidy then corresponds to the marginal benefits of learning-
by-doing, weighted by the marginal utility in the different states of the world and mul-
tiplied by the previously determined optimal subsidy share.  
5  Empirical application 
To illustrate the role of uncertainty for the choice of policy instruments, a highly stylized 
application is considered. The functional specifications are mostly analogous to those 
chosen by Fischer and Newell (2008). The application is calibrated to recent global data 
from IEA (2010) and thus allows identifying the main drivers for the optimal policy mix.  10 
 
 
We consider coal and gas power stations to be the conventional technologies x and y and 
in line with specify quadratic cost functions Cx and Cy respectively:  
 










This implies linear supply functions as shown in Figure 1 for the first period. With the 
parameter values given in Table 1, coal has the lowest marginal generation costs for any 
production quantity when excluding climate damage costs, gas can compete with coal 
only at low generation levels.  
For renewables (technology q) also a quadratic cost function G is specified, yet with 






𝐾   (36) 
 
The parameter values are fixed as indicated in  Table  1, so renewables are non-
competitive with neither learning nor climate damage costs, as illustrated in Figure 1. 
Both cumulative R&D expenditures of previous periods Ht and cumulative previous pro-












   (37) 
 
For k1 and k2 we use the same value of 0.15 as Fischer and Newell (2008), based on the 
elasticity of R&D in different studies (cf. Nadiri 1993).  
We set a constant elasticity R&D investment function, 𝑅(ℎ1) = 𝗾0ℎ1
𝗾1, which has the de-
sired properties as mentioned above as long as γ1>1. 
We also assume a linear demand function 𝐷(𝑡)(𝑃𝑡) = 𝑑0
(𝑡) − 𝑑1𝑃𝑡 with time dependent 
demand level 𝑑0
(𝑡)and a low price sensitivity 𝑑1 as indicated in Table 1 and shown in 




Figure 1: Linear supply functions 
 
For the welfare function (cf. eq. (13)) a logarithmic functional specification is chosen. 
The firms’ utility, i.e. eq (22)and (28) is thereby set to be a linear function of profits, ex-




𝜋   𝜋 ≥ 0
1,15𝜋   𝜋 < 0
   (38) 
 
Also environmental damage is considered to be a quadratic function of emissions with 
the linear term (marginal environmental damage) being uncertain.  
 
𝐵 = 𝑏0 − 𝑏1𝐸 −
1
2𝑏2𝐸2 
where 𝑏1 = 𝜉 
(39) 
 
For the stochastic parameter 𝜉 a uniform distribution between 0 and 100$/t CO2 is as-
sumed.  
Then BE corresponds to 
 
𝐵𝐸 = −𝑏1 − 𝑏2𝐸
= −𝜉 − 𝑏2𝑛(1)�𝜇𝑥𝑥(1) + 𝜇𝑦𝑦(1)�
− 𝑏2𝑛(2) �𝜇𝑥𝑥(2)(𝜉) + 𝜇𝑦𝑦(2)(𝜉)� 
(40) 
                                                        
4 Bankruptcy costs may in general range between roughly 10 to 25 percent of firm value. Cf. e.g. Bris et al. 
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In Table 1 the different parameters and assumptions are summarized. Most of those 
stem from or are calculated based on data from IEA (2010). 
Table 1: Parameters 
Parameters 
cx0  0  $/MWhel  d0(1)  20000  TWh/a 
cx1  44  $/MWhel  d0(2)  32000  TWh/a 
cx2  0.00142985  $/MWhel  d1  20  TWh/($/MWh) 
cy0  0  $/MWhel  b0  0  Mio. $ 
cy1  65  $/MWhel  b1=ξ  ∈[0...100]  $/t 
cy2  0.005079  $/MWhel  b2  0.000001  $/t/Mt 
g0  0  $/MWhel  μx  0.9  t/MWh 
g1  81  $/MWhel  μy  0.416  t/MWh 
g2  0.01632  $/MWhel  i  10  % 
H1  100000    cbankr  15  % 
k1  0.15    n(1) = n(2)  20  a 
k2  0.15    δ =e-i n(2)  0.122   
ρ  0.5         
γ0  1         
γ1  1.01         
 
The optimal decision for the second period may then be obtained solving the linear sys-
tem of equations given in Appendix B: System of equations for second period for a given 
capital stock K2 and a given stochastic realisation 𝜉. When the stochastic distribution is 
approximated by a discrete distribution, the overall problem may be solved numerically 
as a non-linear optimization problem with the first-period variables as only unknowns 
by using the Newton-Raphson-Algorithm. The key results are summarized in Table 2. 
Table 2: Key results of the empirical analysis 
P1  104  $/MWh  P2  113  $/MWh 
h1  88327    R(h1)  98982  Mio. $ 
q1  3180  TWh  q2  10928  TWh 
x1  11085  TWh  x2  13919  TWh 
y1  3645  TWh  y2  4897  TWh 
E1  11493  Mt CO2  E2  14564  Mt CO2 
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With the given data and assumptions, total generation increases by about 65 percent, 
with conventional production only slightly increasing  from approximately 15000 TWh 
in period 1 (2010-2030) to about 19000 TWh in period 2 (2030-2050). Hence, renewa-
ble electricity production increases by a factor of 3.5. Inherently, CO2 emissions expe-
rience a moderate increase of about 25 percent and the electricity price increases by 
about 10 $/MWh. R&D-investment of 100.000 Mio. $ in the first period are found to be 
optimal together with an R&D subsidy share of 52%, a clear evidence for a substantial 
need for R&D support. Production subsidy in contrast seems to be of lower importance 
as this only accounts for roundabout 1 $/MWh. All in all, a clear rationale for support 
mechanisms beyond a CO2-tax or certificate system is given. 
Sensitivity analyses indicate that the basic structure of generation and support shares do 
not change drastically with modified parameters so that optimal policy instruments are 
rather robust towards the choice of parameters – except for the assumptions on tech-
nology spillover.  
6  Conclusion 
In the presence of massive uncertainties and technology spillovers, well-designed sup-
port mechanisms for renewables play a major role, notably as a compensation for tech-
nology spillovers, yet also as a means for reducing investors’ risks. However, to avoid 
excessive  and unnecessary subsidies, the design of the support mechanisms and 
therewith the portfolio of instruments needs to be target-aimed and well-focused. Pro-
duction support mechanisms like feed-in-tariffs provide particularly strong risk reduc-
tion to investors, yet a misbegotten scheme may cause excessive burdens to society – as 
currently experienced for the case of PV support in Germany.  
As shown in the theoretical part, three policy instruments are needed for the existing ex-
ternalities. On the one hand, an emission tax or certificate price, which should equal the 
marginal environmental damage and an R&D subsidy to compensate for technology spil-
lovers. Under uncertainty, the latter is justified even if knowledge is fully appropriable, 
under the condition that the firms’ risk aversion is higher than societal risk aversion. 
Furthermore, to compensate the non-appropriable part of learning-by-doing, a produc-
tion subsidy for low-carbon technologies is needed. Besides the assumptions on tech-
nology costs and uncertainty of emission damage cost, technology spillover clearly plays 
a key role. Yet under some plausible parameter settings, direct subsidies to production 
are found to be of lower importance than very substantial R&D supports. 
All in all, the quantitative results of this study should be considered as an example of 
modeling for insights rather than for numbers. Yet the theoretical results clearly indicate 
that the general rules for optimal policy design in the deterministic case also carry 
through when including uncertainty. However in detail optimal policies may deviate 14 
 
 
from their deterministic counterparts, at least in the presence of individual risk aversion 
and imperfect markets for risks. 
The model discussed here lends itself to further extensions. Notably uncertainty may be 
extended to further factors like electricity demand or fuel prices. But also uncertainty 
within one period may considerably affect the model outcomes. 
A further shortcoming of the approach is that no differentiation between manufacturers 
and producers is included, implying that agency and incentive issues are eliminated 
from the outset. Furthermore the increasing returns to scale in the case of low carbon 
energy implies that individual producers may face negative pay-offs, notably if they are 
not perfectly diversified but are rather owning the marginal unit(s). 
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Appendix A: Further welfare FOC’s 
𝜕𝑊
𝜕𝑦(1) = 0: 𝑃(1) − 𝐶𝑦
′(𝑦(1)) = 






𝜕𝑦(2) = 0: 𝑈′ ∙ �𝐵𝐸 𝑛(2)𝜇𝑦 + 𝑛(2) �𝑃(2) − 𝐶𝑦
′�𝑦(2)��� = 0 
(42) 
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